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PRIVACY AND OUTRAGE 
by Jordan M. Blanke* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is not an understatement that technology has dramatically altered virtually 
every aspect of our life in recent years. While technology has always driven change, 
these changes are occurring more rapidly and more extensively than ever before. 
We are fully entrenched in the world of Big Data, the Internet of Things, and Smart 
Cities – and we are never going back. As always, society and its laws must evolve, 
but it is not always an easy process. 
The notion of privacy has certainly changed in our data-driven world and 
continues to change daily. While it has always been difficult to define exactly what 
privacy is, it is even more difficult to propose what privacy should become. 
Technology and its uses – or abuses – are altering the notion of privacy into 
something that may be unrecognizable in the near future. 
Studies show that people say they are still concerned about privacy, but their 
behavior does not reflect that.1 Like any value, the importance of privacy varies 
from person to person. This makes it even more difficult to establish a one-size-
fits-all concept of privacy. This paper explores some of the historical, legal, and 
ethical development of privacy; discusses how some of the normative values of 
privacy may survive or change; and examines how outrage has been – and will 
continue to be – a driver of such change. 
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PRIVACY 
 
While a legally protected right to privacy in the United States traces its roots 
back little more than a century and a quarter,2 privacy as a social value or norm 
arguably has roots as old as humankind. In fact, one of the fathers of the notion of 
modern privacy, Alan Westin, believed that the importance of privacy as a basic 
characteristic is seen even among other species in the animal kingdom – “men and 
animals share several basic mechanisms for claiming privacy among their own 
fellows.”3 
Westin described four basic states of privacy: 1) solitude – the desire of an 
individual to separate from the group and be free, at least temporarily, from 
observation by others; 2) intimacy – the ability of an individual to have a close 
relationship with someone else in a pairing (e.g., marriage) or small group (e.g., 
family); 3) anonymity – the ability of a person to participate in a public forum or 
venue, while being free from identification or surveillance; and 4) reserve – the 
most subtle state, the “creation of a psychological barrier against unwanted 
intrusion.”4  Westin also defined privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others.”5 We will see that this becomes a dominant 
theme in privacy scholarship and is certainly relevant today. 
Charles Fried stated that “[p]rivacy is not simply an absence of information 
about what is in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over information 
about ourselves.”6 Similarly, Ruth Gavison described privacy as a form of limiting 
access to oneself, and stated that the “concept of privacy . . . is a complex of . . . 
three independent and irreducible elements: secrecy, anonymity, and solitude.”7 
More recently Daniel Solove summarized six different conceptions of 
privacy: 1) the right to be left alone; 2) limited access to the self; 3) secrecy; 4) 
control over personal information; 5) personhood – “the protection of one’s 
personality, individuality, and dignity;” and 6) intimacy. 8  He noted that there may 
be overlap between and among the conceptions and that they are not independent 
of one another, “[f]or example, control over personal information can be seen as a 
subset of limited access to the self, which in turn bears significant similarities to 
the right to be let alone.”9 
																																								 																				
2 The origin of privacy as a legal notion in the United States traces back to Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis’s article proposing a right “to be let alone.”  Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, 
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.R. 193, 206 (1890). 
3 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, 8-11 (1967). 
4 Id. at 32-34. 
5 Id. at 7. 
6 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477-78 (1968). 
7 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 433 (1980). 
8 Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL L. REV. 1087, 1092 (2002).  
9 Id. 
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There have been many different approaches to describing what privacy is 
and what privacy should be throughout history10. It is a fundamental aspect of 
humankind that has evolved and continues to evolve. Technology often drives 
social change, and with respect to privacy, that has certainly been the case. As 
society adapts, so does the notion of privacy. 
 
NORMATIVE VALUES OF PRIVACY AND CONTEXT 
 
Robert Post wrote about the normative values of privacy behind the 
rationale for the four branches of the common law invasion of privacy tort11. In 
discussing the intrusion branch, he cited Erving Goffman’s notion of “territories” 
or “preserves” that help define a space in which someone could expect to have 
privacy12 . These spaces are not defined by objective standards like feet or inches, 
but rather by subjective standards that are socially determined based upon context. 
In discussing the public disclosure branch, he again refers to Goffman’s notion of 
“information preserves” or “boundaries” within which information is contained and 
which are normatively determined13. “[J]ust as individuals expect to control certain 
spatial territories, so they expect to control certain informational territories.”14 The 
boundaries of these information spaces are determined by local custom and by “the 
norm of the ordinary man” and are important in defining the standards of civility 
which support the public disclosure tort.15 “Information preserves, like spatial 
territories, provide a normative framework for the development of individual 
personality. Just as we feel violated when our bedrooms are invaded, so we 
																																								 																				
10 See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE and PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, CONSUMER PRIVACY AND DATA 
PROTECTION 25-45 (2015) for an excellent discussion on the history and evolution of the 
definition and value of privacy. 
11 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law 
Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 971-72 (1989). The four branches of the tort of invasion of privacy are 
summarized in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977):  
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the 
resulting harm to the interests of the other. 
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by: 
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in 
652B; or 
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in 652C; or 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in 
652D; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before 
the public, as stated in 652E. 
12 Post, supra note 9, at 971-72 (citing Erving Goffman, The Territories of the Self, in RELATIONS 
IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 28 (1971)). 
13 Id. at 984. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 984-85. 
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experience the inappropriate disclosure of private information as ‘pollutions or 
defilements’”.16 
Jeffrey Rosen continued the theme of privacy and context, describing how, 
in “a world of short attention spans,” information can easily be taken out of 
context.17 If personal information is shared in a group of people familiar with the 
subject of the information, they can digest that information in context, weighing it 
against other information they know about that person’s character and personality18. 
If, however, that same information is shared with strangers, there is no context 
against which the information can be judged19. 
In her classic paper, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, Helen Nissenbaum 
emphasized the importance of context: “A central tenet of contextual integrity is 
that there are no arenas of life not governed by norms of information flow, no 
information or spheres of life for which ‘anything goes’”20. Almost everything we 
do “happens in a context not only of place but of politics, convention, and cultural 
expectation.”21 In virtually every aspect of our daily life, we move among various 
spheres, realms, or contexts – being at home with one’s family, visiting a doctor, 
going to church – that are, to various degrees, defined by distinct sets of norms. 
These spheres “offer a platform for a normative account of privacy in terms of 
contextual integrity.”22 
Nissenbaum stated that contextual norms can come from various sources, 
including history, culture and law23. Many of them involve information. She 
proposed “two types of informational norms: norms of appropriateness, and norms 
of flow or distribution. Contextual integrity is maintained when both types of norms 
are upheld, and it is violated when either of the norms is violated.”24 
Contextual integrity often explains how social values evolve and become 
part of the social structure and law. Nissenbaum stated that the “context of elections 
for political office is [an example] of a settled normative framework.”25 There are 
high expectations of privacy when people vote. They vote without anyone knowing 
for whom or for what they voted. Unless they decide to share this information, no 
one else will know. They fully control the flow of information. 
 
																																								 																				
16 Id. at 985. 
17 Jeffrey Rosen, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA, 8 (2000). 
18 Id. at 8-9. 
19 Id. at 9. 
20 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 137 (2004). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 138 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 146. 
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In the United States, there are only a few areas in which individuals have 
control over their information. If it is credit-related, medical-related or pertains to 
video rental habits (amazingly), laws provide a degree of control over the 
information flow26.For the most part, however, if the information pertains to 
anything else, there is very little law that controls the flow. Changes in law are often 
driven by changes in values. Is it possible that sufficient change in the normative 
values of privacy – particularly in the flow of information – can dictate changes in 
the law? Is it possible that such changes in normative values can sufficiently modify 
behavior even without changes in the law? 
One of the cases that Nissenbaum examined in her 2004 article dealt with 
consumer profiling and data mining27.The issues she presented then have only been 
exacerbated over time. With regard to consumer profiling and data mining, 
Nissenbaum noted that “the crucial issue is not whether the information is private 
or public, gathered from private or public settings, but whether the action breaches 
contextual integrity.”28 With the proliferation of collection of data from sensors, 
smart phones and the Web, and the advent of Smart Cities, and the trend towards 
the merger of public and private data, this observation becomes even more 
significant and more prescient.  
Nissenbaum shows how Amazon.com’s use of data analytics on 
information provided to it by its customers arguably does not breach either the norm 
of appropriateness or the norm of flow29. A grocer’s collection of information about 
customers’ vacation or movie choices might not breach the norm of 
appropriateness. But if that grocer then sells the information to a data broker, where 
that information will likely be used out of context, there may very well be breaches 
of both the norms of appropriateness and flow. Society surpasses these examples 
from 2004, but is it still possible that our privacy norms can be modified? Can 
society develop a different value expectation regarding the collection or use of 
information? Is it possible to develop a new normative expectation of privacy in 
information? 
Adam Moore gives an extreme example of the type of data shifting – or 
breach of contextual integrity – that Nissenbaum described30. Actress Rebecca 
Schaeffer provided her home address to her local department of motor vehicles, 
who then sold it to a data broker, who then sold it to a man, who went to Schaeffer’s 
																																								 																				
26 Privacy protection in the United States is very sectoral in its approach. For example, information 
relating to credit ratings is highly regulated under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) (15 
U.S.C. § 1681); medical information is highly regulated under the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (P.L. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936, enacted August 21, 1996); and 
video rental habits are highly regulated under the Video Privacy Protection Act (18 U.S.C. § 
2710). Information not regulated by one of these specific laws is subject to very little regulation. 
27 Nissenbaum, supra note 20, at 152. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 152-53. 
30 Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV 809, 826 (2007). 
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house, and murdered her. Moore sees digitization and aggregation of data as 
making the potential for this type of misuse even more likely31. Certainly this is 
even more true today. Aggregation of data has reached a point where it is 
questionable whether uses of data can even be separated anymore.  
Anita Allen writes that she has “explored the normative ethical value of 
privacy, evaluated the normative ethics of privacy laws, and pondered the extent of 
normative ethical obligations to protect one’s own and others’ privacy.”32 Recently 
she questions whether “individuals . . . have a moral obligation to protect their own 
privacy information.”33 Focusing on information privacy, she describes the current 
era as the “Great Privacy Give-Away,” in which people are “giving away more and 
more personal data to intimates and strangers for a variety of . . . reasons.”34 Allen 
stated,  
 
Among duties to self is a duty to protect one's own informational 
privacy. One ought to limit disclosures of information about oneself 
for utility reasons, pertaining to one's reputation and future 
opportunity; and/or virtue reasons, pertaining to modesty, reserve 
and temperance; and/or Kantian reasons, pertaining to dignity, self-
respect, autonomy, and freedom.35 
 
In a presentation of Allen’s recent paper regarding New York’s decision to 
protect a photographer who took photographs of people, in various intimate 
positions, through the open windows of their homes, there was a discussion about 
how social norms of price vary36. A woman from the Netherlands said that back 
home many people also do not have curtains on ground floor apartments, but it is 
custom not to look into another person’s home. She stated that children are taught 
this at an early age and it has become a social norm there. 
Certainly, social norms are affected by many things – morals, ethics, 
values, customs, expectations, technology – and these change over time. Allen 
notes that within her lifetime it used to be socially – and legally – acceptable to 
ban marriage between people of different races37. Until very recently, marriage 
between people of the same gender was illegal. It was not until social values and 
																																								 																				
31 Id. 
32 Anita L. Allen, Privacy Law: Positive Theory and Normative Practice, 126 HARV. L. REV. 241, 
241 (2010). 
33 Anita L. Allen, An Ethical Duty to Protect One’s Own Information Privacy?, 64 ALA. L. REV. 
845, 846 (2013). 
34 Id. at 846-47. 
35 Id. at 852. 
36 Ninth Annual Privacy Law Scholars Conference at the George Washington University School of 
Law, June 2, 2016. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.  
37 Allen, supra note 33, at 849. 
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norms changed sufficiently enough that there became a demand that the law 
change as well.    
Roger Ford provided several examples of how social norms change, some 
becoming more permissive and some more restrictive, and how this sometimes also 
prompts changes in law38. He discussed how Douglas Ginsburg’s admission in 1987 
of marijuana use basically derailed his Supreme Court nomination.  He also 
discussed how subsequent admissions by Clarence Thomas, Bill Clinton and 
Barack Obama did little more than make news headlines39. He noted how, as 
recently as 1968, “George Wallace won five states and forty-six electoral votes, 
running for president on an openly segregationist platform – a result that would be 
unimaginable today.”40 Social norms can and do change over time. 
Ford discussed how privacy norms regarding information flows have 
become less permissive as more and more information is being collected and used 
for, among other things, targeted advertising. He noted that some privacy norms 
have changed over the years to become more protective of privacy.  For example, 
voting in the 1880s and 1890s, student records under FERPA in 1974, and sensitive 
personal information in federal court filings in 2007.41 While each of these 
examples involved changes of law, they were, as is often the case, a response to 
changing social norms.42 Ford gave an example of Nissenbaum’s contextual 
integrity: “[n]o one blinks an eye when a dating website asks someone about his or 
her romantic preferences . . . but it would be strange if Amazon, or the DMV, started 
asking shoppers or applicants for driver’s licenses if they prefer blondes or 
brunettes.”43 Ford wrote his article in 2016. Unless our normative values of privacy 
and/or our laws change soon, there will be no need for Amazon or the DMV to ask 
that question – they will already know. 
 
WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO CHANGE? 
 
Much has been written in the last fifty years about the normative nature of 
privacy because of the Katz decision, and the importance of its normative 
reasonable expectation of privacy standard44. Unfortunately, much of the evolution 
																																								 																				
38 Roger Allan Ford, Unilateral Invasions of Privacy, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2016). 
39 Id. at 1090. 
40 Id. at 1090 n.53. 
41 Id. at 1091. 
42 Id. at 1092. 
43 Id. at 1090. 
44 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The test has both a 
subjective and an objective part, although in recent years, there has been discussion that, as 
originally proposed, the test was to have had only an objective part. See Peter Winn, Katz and the 
Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2009); 
Harvey A. Schneider, Katz v. United States: The Untold Story, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 13 (2009); 
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of privacy in a digital world was thwarted by the events of 9/11 in 2001, which 
placed an almost insurmountable weight on the scales of the privacy versus security 
balancing test. For mostly understandable reasons, security is given great 
deference.  
In describing what he says might be called the “security trumps” view – that 
“whenever privacy and security conflict, security wins”, Adam Moore disputes why 
this view would have to be adopted over a “privacy trumps” view.45 He questions 
why a strong privacy interest in ownership of data, for example, would not be “at 
least as fundamental or intuitively weighty as security.”46 Additional interest in 
privacy could actually increase security. He claims that “it is false to claim that 
more privacy means less security or that more security means less privacy.”47 
Moore concludes that a “transparent society is not inevitable. Privacy at the 
personal level can be secured through custom and social pressure. Privacy related 
to big media, corporations and the state can be guaranteed by law and grounded in 
customs and social practices.”48  
The drive for transparency in cities and states adopting open records or open 
government laws provides another forum in which this issue may evolve49. There 
will be massive amounts of information, collected from a variety of sources – both 
public and private – and potentially used for a variety of purposes. Many of the 
same issues that apply to Nissenbaum’s example of consumer profiling and data 
mining will apply here. Certainly there will be numerous issues of contextual 
integrity. Cities, like Seattle, which is using an open, collaborative, and iterative 
approach, are trying to develop new models for protecting privacy and may be 
instrumental in developing new norms and expectations for privacy50. 
 
 
																																								 																				
Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 113 (2015). 
45 Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV 809, 839-40 
(2007). There is a growing realization that privacy and security are intricately and necessarily 
intertwined. Often, one who works in security views privacy as a subset of security, and one who 
works in privacy views security as a subset of privacy. It is becoming apparent that the two 
interests are enhanced and stronger when designed and developed together. See Security and 
Privacy Controls for Information Systems, Draft NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5, 
August 2017, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-53/sp800-53r5-draft.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2017). 
46 Id. at 840. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 844. 
49 See What is Open Data? Open Data Handbook, http://opendatahandbook.org/guide/en/ (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2017); The 8 Principles of Open Government Data, https://opengovdata.org/ (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2017). 
50 See Janine S. Hiller & Jordan M. Blanke, Smart Cities, Big Data, and the Resilience of Privacy, 
68 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 332-34 (2017). 
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OUTRAGE 
 
One of the things that can potentially shape a new norm is outrage. If enough 
people are outraged about an activity that violates a norm - or about a new activity 
for which there may not yet be a norm – change may result. For example, suppose 
an individual receives an email saying, “We notice how you voted for Reagan and 
Bush back in the 1980s, but that you then voted for Clinton and Obama in the 1990s 
and 2000s. We want you back. Please vote for the Republican candidate this 
year!”51 Most people probably would be outraged. There are very strong social 
norms with regard to the privacy of information about voting – there are also laws 
protecting that privacy52.  
Several years back, there was an outcry when CVS sent non-customers a 
letter basically saying, “[w]e see your prescription for Prozac is about to run out. 
Why don’t you transfer your prescription to us and we’ll give you $20 off?” Many 
people were outraged at this seeming breach of privacy – at least what many people 
probably would have considered to be a breach of privacy.53 And because it 
involved medical information, it also probably violated the law. In our current 
environment of Big Data and The Internet of Everything, there have certainly been 
many more examples of this type of use of data that would reach or exceed one's 
creepiness comfort level54.  
Data brokers, search engines, websites, apps and just about anything else 
capable of collecting information does so today. It is easy to say, “You have zero 
privacy. Get over it.”55 Regarding the massive amount of personal information that 
has already been collected, it is easy to think, “the cow is already out of the barn,” 
or “the cat is already out of the bag.” And to some extent, that is no doubt true. 
																																								 																				
51 Or “We notice that you voted for Clinton and Obama. Why did you vote for Trump? We want 
you back. Please vote for the Democratic candidate this year!” 
52 See Caitriona Fitzgerald, Pamela Smith &Susannah Goodman, The Secret Ballot at Risk: 
Recommendations for Protecting Democracy (Aug. 18, 2016), http://secretballotatrisk.org/Secret-
Ballot-At-Risk.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2017). 
53 See Health Privacy Stories (Mar. 5, 2007), 
https://www.cdt.org/files/healthprivacy/20080311stories.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2017); David 
Lazarus, Opening Your Pill Box for Bulk Mailers (June 11, 2008), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/11/business/fi-lazarus11 (last visited Sept. 5, 2017). 
54 See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting 
Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59 (2013); Anna Johnston, Creepiness is in the Eye of the 
Beholder (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.salingerprivacy.com.au/2015/10/15/creepiness/ (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2017); Sid Lipsey, Collecting Customer Data Without Being Creepy, 
https://relate.zendesk.com/articles/collecting-customer-data-without-creepiness/ (last visited Sept. 
5, 2017). 
55 Edward C. Baig, Marcia Stepanek &Neil Gross, Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Personal 
Information, What's in It for You?, BUS. WK., Apr. 5, 1999, at 84 (quoting Scott McNealy, CEO of 
Sun Microsystems, at a product launch). 
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However, there are still abuses that can come from additional sharing of the data – 
certainly from cross-contextual uses – that can be avoided. 
Bryce Newell wrote about defining a normative definition of informational 
privacy that would include “the right to control both initial and subsequent uses of 
personal information.”56 He stated that this right “should have legal ‘teeth.’”57 The 
absence of teeth in privacy law today is best illustrated by the many examples of 
leaked nude photographs of celebrities. For the most part, once the image is out of 
the barn or out of the bag, it is gone. There has been very little that one can do to 
enforce such a violation of privacy. Privacy law just has not had “teeth.”  
Due in great part to public outrage, we are finally beginning to see some 
change. Privacy law may actually be cutting some “baby teeth.” In 2011, two nude 
selfies of Scarlett Johansson were published on the Web. Aware of the lack of 
success by previous attempts to threaten lawsuits alleging invasion of privacy, 
Johansson instead turned to copyright law, complete with its full set of teeth. 
Utilizing the “takedown” provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, a very 
toothy provision, she notified websites that they were displaying copyrighted 
content and that they risked liability under copyright law if they failed to remove 
the photos58. This resulted in far more websites removing the photos than if the 
threat had been merely one involving privacy violations. 
However, somewhat surprisingly, the hacker who stole the photos from 
Johansson’s email account was prosecuted, and pleaded guilty to violations of the 
federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), and was sentenced to the 
maximum 10 years in prison59. The court found that Johansson (and the other 
celebrities involved) had suffered both economic loss and severe emotional 
distress60. The Assistant Director in charge of the local FBI office stated that 
defendant’s actions were “tantamount to breaking and entering of [the celebrities’] 
private homes by a thief in the night.”61 Consistent with slowly changing societal 
																																								 																				
56 Bryce Clayton Newell, Crossing Lenses: Policing’s New Visibility and the Role of “Smartphone 
Journalism” as a Form of Freedom-Preserving Reciprocal Surveillance, 34 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & 
POL’Y 59, 75 (2014). 
57 Id.  
58 Pursuant to Section 512(g)(1) of Title 17 of the United States Code, “a service provider shall not 
be liable to any person for any claim based on the service providers’ good faith disabling of access 
to, or removal of, material . . .  regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately 
determined to be infringing.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1). This so-called “DCMA takedown notice” has 
become extremely common as a way of preventing liability for copyright infringement. Regardless 
of whether there might be infringement, taking down the allegedly infringing item is an easy and 
effective way to avoid liability. 
59 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5) and 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012). See Christopher Satti, A Call to (Cyber) 
Arms: Applicable Statutes and Suggested Courses of Action for the Celebrity iCloud Hacking 
Scandal, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 561, 580-81 (2016); Jessica E. Easterly, Terror in Tinseltown: 
Who is Accountable When Hollywood Gets Hacked, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 331, 348 (2016). 
60 Satti, supra note 59, at 580. 
61 Id. at 580-81. 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet • Vol. 9 • 2018 
Privacy and Outrage 
________________________________________________________________________ 
	
11 
	
values, some privacy laws, which have been on the books for quite some time, are 
beginning to be used more frequently and more effectively. 
Similarly, in 2014, nude photos of many celebrities, including Jennifer 
Lawrence, were leaked and published on many websites62. While efforts to quickly 
remove the photos were not particularly effective, there have been two convictions 
under the CFAA. Apparently, most of the photos were obtained as a result of at 
least two, apparently independent, phishing scams whereby the hackers convinced 
the celebrities to divulge username and password information. Both convictions 
were obtained under a section of the CFAA prohibiting unauthorized accessing of 
a protected computer63 . While both faced up to 5 years in prison, one defendant 
was sentenced to 18 months in October 201664 and the other to 9 months in January 
201765. 
We are beginning to see the results of some public outrage because of these 
celebrity hackings. Regarding the Jennifer Lawrence incident, the publication of 
the stolen photographs “has been lambasted by the public and media for being a 
gross invasion of privacy . . . Beloved public figures like Jennifer Lawrence, made 
vulnerable by having their naked bodies non-consensually exposed to the world, 
are . . .  sympathetic characters.”66 
Public outrage has also been evident a few times regarding the failure of 
existing Peeping Tom statutes to successfully prosecute “upskirt photographers.”67 
There have been several instances where upskirt photographers escaped conviction 
either because of narrow interpretations of “reasonable expectation of privacy” or 
because of the specific language in the relevant statute. In 2014 the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court overturned a conviction under the state’s Peeping Tom 
statute because the statute required proof that the person photographed be “nude or 
partially nude.”68 Even though the “victim” was a transit officer who was part of a 
sting operation and there was ample evidence of the upskirt photography, the court 
																																								 																				
62 See Easterly, supra note 56, at 334-35. 
63 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012); See Satti, supra note 56, at 581-82; Easterly, supra note 59, 
at 348-49. 
64 Alan Yuhas, Hacker Who Stole Nude Photos of Celebrities Gets 18 Months in Prison, The 
Guardian (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/27/nude-celebrity-
photos-hacker-prison-sentence-ryan-collins.  
65 Chicago Man Gets 9 Months in Celebrity Nude Photo Hack, USA Today (Jan. 24, 2017), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/movies/2017/01/24/chicago-man-gets-9-months-celebrity-
nude-photo-hack/97011632/. 
66 Easterly, supra note 59, at 345. 
67 See Jeffrey T. Marvin, Without a Bright-Line on a Green Line: How Commonwealth v. 
Robertson Failed to Criminalize Upskirt Photography, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 119 (2015); Marc 
Tran, Combatting Gender Privilege and Recognizing a Woman’s Right to Privacy in Public 
Spaces: Arguments to Criminalize Catcalling and Creepshots, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 185 
(2016). 
68 Commonwealth v. Robertson, 5 N.E.3d 522, 529 (Mass. 2014) (refusing to apply Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 272, § 105(b) to upskirt photography) 
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strictly interpreted the language of the statute – because she was not nude or 
partially nude.69 The public outcry was immediate70 and two days after the court’s 
decision, the governor signed into law new language to close the loophole71. 
Similarly, in Georgia, a 6-3 decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals 
overturned the conviction of an upskirt photographer because the relevant statute 
required that the photograph or recording be taken “in any private place and out of 
public view.”72 The court ruled that “place” referred to a physical location, rather 
than a part of the body, and since the recording was done in a public grocery store, 
it was not done in a private place as required by the statute.73 There has been a great 
deal of public outrage about the decision and it is probably just a matter of time 
before the Georgia legislature fixes the loophole74.  
Another incident involving what many would likely deem to be an invasion 
of privacy has also sparked a call to action – most notably from the court rendering 
the decision. In the case mentioned earlier, regarding the photographer who 
surreptitiously took photographs of his neighbors through their open windows from 
his apartment, the New York Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, affirmed 
the dismissal of an invasion of privacy action brought by the parents of two children 
who were photographed75. Despite the fact that the subjects never knew about nor 
gave permission to the taking of the photographs, despite the fact that the 
photographs were of people in their own homes – and in some cases, in their 
bedrooms, despite the fact that some of the individuals, including one of the 
children, were recognizable from the photographs, and despite the fact that the 
address of the building was publicly disclosed as part of one of the exhibitions of 
																																								 																				
69 Id.  
70 Haimy Assefa, Massachusetts Court Says ‘Upskirt’ Photos Are Legal, CNN (Mar. 6, 2014, 7:33 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/05/us/massachusetts-upskirt-photography/. 
71 Mark Mermot, Update: Massachusetts Bans ‘Upskirt’ Photography, NPR (Mar. 7, 2014, 9:00 
AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/03/06/286690512/read-it-and-rate-it-court-
rules-upskirt-photos-are-legal. 
72 Georgia Appeals Court Says “Upskirting” is Legal, CBS NEWS (July 25, 2016, 12:58 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/georgia-appeals-court-upskirting-is-legal/. 
73 Id.  
74 Kristina Torres, Senate Votes to Ban ‘Upskirting’ in Georgia, AJC.com (Feb. 15, 2017, 12:02 
PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/senate-votes-ban-upskirting-
georgia/lqjMcLuH55z6YZBPcV5K4M/.. 
75 Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). See Hili Perlson, Voyeuristic 
Photographer Arne Svenson Wins New York Appellate Court Case, ARTNET NEWS (April 10, 
2015), https://news.artnet.com/market/arne-svenson-neighbors-photographs-supreme-court-
286916; Eugene Volokh, N.Y. Court: Legal to Surreptitiously Photograph People in Their Own 
Homes, and Sell Those Photographs, The Washington Post (April 10, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/04/10/n-y-court-legal-to-
surreptitiously-photograph-people-in-their-homes-and-sell-those-
photos/?utm_term=.ed161a4dcb3f ; Christopher Visentin, Case Review: Foster v. Svenson (2015), 
Center for Art Law (May 29, 2015), https://itsartlaw.com/2015/05/29/foster-v-svenson/. 
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the photographs, the case was dismissed. New York has never adopted the 
traditional common law tort of invasion of privacy, but rather, has statutory 
protection that addresses only the misappropriation prong of the tort76. Accordingly, 
the court held that the First Amendment value of the photographs as art, along with 
an absence of traditional commercial appropriation, required a dismissal of the 
claim77.  
The court held that “the defendant’s conduct, however disturbing it may be, 
cannot properly, under the current state of the law, be deemed so ‘outrageous’ that 
it went beyond the decency and the protections” of the statutes78. The court 
continued, “we do not, in any way, mean to give short shrift to plaintiffs’ concerns79. 
Undoubtedly, like plaintiffs, many people would be rightfully offended by the 
intrusive manner in which the photographs were taken in this case. However, such 
complaints are best addressed to the legislature.”80 
In an area of the law that may become the poster child for public outrage as 
a driver of change, 35 states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation 
to ban so-called “revenge porn,” or the nonconsensual publication of sexually 
graphic or intimate photographs or video81. Typically, it is an ex-husband or ex-
boyfriend who distributes these photos or videos without the consent of his prior 
partner. In addition to legislation, many social media sites, including Google, 
Twitter and Reddit, largely in response to the public outcry, have also banned the 
practice82.  
An example of what might be better described as public outcry, rather than 
public outrage, about half of the states have passed, and almost all of the states have 
proposed, legislation that bans employers from requiring the disclosure of 
passwords related to an employee’s or an applicant’s social media accounts.83 In 
																																								 																				
76 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50 and 51 (Consol. 2000). 
77 Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 160. 
78 Id. at 163 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach of Trust: Fighting Nonconsensual Pornography, 102 IOWA L. 
REV. 709, 710-11 n.4 (2017). The number of states is now up to 38 according to the web site, 
Cyber Civil Rights Initiative. See https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2017). 
82 Waldman, supra note 81, at 711. 
83 See Jordan M. Blanke, The Legislative Response to Employers’ Requests for Password 
Disclosure, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 42 (2014); Susan Park, Employee Internet Privacy: A Proposed 
Act that Balances Legitimate Employer Rights and Employee Privacy, 51 AMER. BUS. L.J. 779 
(2014); Robert Sprague, No Surfing Allowed: A Review and Analysis of Legislation Prohibiting 
Employers from Demanding Access to Employees’ and Job Applicants’ Social Media Accounts, 24 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 481(2014). See also Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, 
NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGIS., 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-access-
to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx. 
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2010, there was a well-publicized story about a job applicant in Maryland, who was 
required by a prospective employer to disclose his Facebook log-in and password 
as part of his job application process84. In 2012, largely in response to the public 
outcry from this incident, Illinois, Maryland, California and Michigan became the 
first states to pass legislation to curb this practice, with many other states modelling 
their legislation after those first efforts85.  
In recent decades, we have seen changes in social norms and behavior 
regarding copyright protection, first in the 1980s and 1990s regarding software, and 
then again in the late 1990s and early 2000s regarding digital music86. One 
significant difference, however, is that the drivers of the change in those cases were 
the content holders – the software companies and the music labels – and they had 
the significant “teeth” of the copyright law behind them. Lawrence Lessig wrote 
about how far behind protection for privacy is compared to protection for 
intellectual property, largely because of the traditional view of intellectual property 
as property87. It takes much longer to effect change if the general public is the driver 
rather than a defined group with a specific interest involved.  
Another interesting example of outrage – although it may more properly be 
described as fear – dates back to the nomination of potential Supreme Court Justice 
Robert Bork.  After a local Washington, D.C. reporter was able to obtain the history 
of all of Bork’s videotape rentals from his local video store, a number of 
Congressmen learned that these type of records were actually being maintained88. 
																																								 																				
84 Meredith Curtis, Want a Job? Password, Please!, ACLU.org (Feb. 18, 2011, 2:04 PM), 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/want-job-password-please. (video interview 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDaX5DTmbfY); Aaron C. Davis, Md. 
Corrections Department Suspends Facebook Policy for Prospective Hires, Wash. Post Breaking 
News Blog (Feb. 22, 2011, 9:58 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/02/22/AR2011022207486.html. 
85 Blanke, supra note 83, at 42-48. 
86 In the 1980s and 1990s, the software industry was losing a lot of money from the illegal copying 
of software. After several years of playing cat and mouse games with a variety of copy-protection 
schemes, the industry more-or-less gave up on those schemes and relied instead on educating the 
public that while you can make a copy of the software, you should not make a copy.  While illegal 
copying of software can never be eradicated, many people learned that it was not ethically 
appropriate to use software without paying for it. It took a long time for the software industry to 
change this normative behavior. Similarly, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with the introduction 
of Napster and other peer-to-peer networks, the illegal copying of music was rampant. It took a 
long time for the music industry to effect some change in behavior with a combination of 
education, a series of lawsuits by the Recording Industry Association of America, and the 
introduction of the Apple Store (as a relatively painless alternative). Again, while illegal copying 
of music can never be eradicated, normative behavior has changed. 
87 See Lawrence Lessig, Privacy as Property, 69 SOC. RES. 247 (2002). 
88 See Stephen Advokat, Publication of Bork’s Video Rentals Raises Privacy Issue, CHI. TRIB. 
(Nov. 20, 1987), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-11-
20/entertainment/8703270590_1_video-rentals-video-stores-bork-opponent (last visited Sept. 6, 
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In very short order, Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection Act of 198889. 
Fortunately for members of Congress, their outrage – or fear – can be immediately 
remedied; unfortunately, for society, it generally takes a long time for public 
outrage to effect change. 
 
WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS 
 
While public outrage can often trigger quick legislative response, it usually 
takes a good bit of time for social normative behavior to evolve.  With regard to 
informational privacy, it becomes even more difficult because of the ever-changing 
technology and its immediate effect on daily life. Too often, this comes with a ready 
acceptance of a diminished privacy. There is reason, however, to be optimistic that 
the tide is beginning to turn when it comes to society’s expectation of privacy and 
evolving social norms. Specifically, there are six themes or developments regarding 
privacy that are making the environment ripe for changes in values, social norms, 
and privacy laws: 
 
1. The shift from an emphasis on notice and choice to collection and use90. 
While this is mostly attributable to the utter failure of notice and consent to 
provide any real privacy protection, the reality is that it is more important 
now to try to limit the collection and use of data - both data that has already 
																																								 																				
https://newrepublic.com/article/111331/robert-bork-dead-video-rental-records-story-sparked-
privacy-laws (last visited Sept. 6, 2017). 
89 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988). 
90 The Fair Information Privacy Principles (FIPPs) have been variously stated and have evolved 
over time, but have always included the notions of both notice and choice and collection and use. 
Introduced in 1973 by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in a document entitled 
Records, Computer, and the Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on 
Automated Personal Data Systems 
(http://aspe.hhs.gov/DATACNCL/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 
2017)), the FIPPs were then revised in 1980 by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in a document entitled Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (the “OECD Guidelines”) 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsof
personaldata.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2018)). The OECD Guidelines were a primary source for 
the development of the European Data Directive of 1995 (Directive 95/46 on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, 1005 O.J. (L 281) (EC)) and are also largely the basis for the current iteration of FIPPs 
adopted by many federal agencies and incorporated into the Office of Management Budget’s 
important 2016 revision, Circular A-130 
(https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/a130revised.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2017). See 
Richard Warner and Robert Sloan, Beyond Notice and Choice: Privacy, Norms and Consent, 14 J. 
HIGH TECH. L. 370 (2014). 
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been collected and that which has not. Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity 
theory is largely responsible for driving this change91. 
2. The recognition of the importance of trust as it pertains to privacy. Neil 
Richards and Woodrow Hartzog recently wrote that “modern privacy law is 
incomplete because from its inception it has failed to account for the 
importance of trust.”92 The role of trust in privacy relationships is beginning 
to emerge as an integral part of the normative value of privacy.  
3. The recognition that the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is – 
and always should have been described as – solely an objective test93. This 
will empower courts to more accurately assess, based upon normative data, 
what “reasonable expectations” truly are and should be.  
4. All of the efforts to convince people to design for privacy are starting to pay 
dividends94 . Furthermore, people are realizing that both privacy and 
security solutions need to be designed harmoniously95. NIST’s recent 
publication is a perfect example of this: Security and Privacy Controls for 
Information Systems and Organizations96. 
5. Peer pressure. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will 
become effective in May 2018 in the European Union97. Its omnibus 
approach to data protection is a stark contrast to the sectoral approach taken 
by the United States.98 
6. Privacy as strategy. Companies are beginning to realize that privacy pays. 
Richards and Hartzog wrote “If people don’t trust a company, they are more 
likely to switch to a competitor.”99 While NIST guidelines are required for 
federal agencies only, private industry has adopted many of the security 
standards set forth in its Cybersecurity Framework100. It is hoped that many 
																																								 																				
91 See supra text accompanying notes 20-43. 
92 Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. 
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95 See supra footnote 45. 
96 Id. 
97 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 87. 
98 See supra footnote 26. 
99 Richards and Hartzog, supra note 92, at 435. 
100“A recent Gartner study reported that NIST's Cybersecurity Framework is already used by 30% 
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companies will also adopt the principles of its Privacy Framework101. 
Additionally, while the GDPR pertains only to the EU and its citizens, many 
U.S. companies function globally and will have to comply with the new 
standards anyway, and are expected to adopt some of those standards across 
the board102. Companies are realizing that it makes sense for them to 
embrace and sell privacy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
One of the drivers of social change has always been outrage. We are 
beginning to see a number of examples of changes occurring because of 
dissatisfaction with current privacy standards.103  There is often a swift legislative 
response, but it usually takes longer for social values or norms to adjust. It appears 
that the environment is ripe for change to take place. People’s actual “expectations 
of privacy” may finally be able to shape new privacy values and norms for our 
digital world. 
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